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Research 
Abstract:  Determining the locus and the logic of decision making in the EU Council of 
Ministers continues to be a major challenge. Insiders and outsiders have difficulty explaining 
why some issues move swiftly and smoothly through the Council, while others ‘get stuck’ at 
working  party,  Coreper  or  the  ministerial  level.  This  paper  reconceptualises  the  internal 
negotiations as battles between drivers and brakemen, whereby the goal is to keep issues on 
or off the (ministers’) agenda. It also addresses the follow up question: whether either side 
has  a  structural  advantage  in  these  procedural  battles?  It  clarifies  the  working  of  this 
mechanism  by  means  of  a  process  tracing  analysis  of  one  particular  decision-making 
trajectory: that concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia. 
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Introduction 
The Council of Ministers, the main decision-making forum in the European Union, continues 
to serve as a classic example of a black box. From the outside, the Council (quite literally) 
appears a monolithic bloc, spewing out its decisions from time to time. From the inside, it 
rather looks like a perpetual mobile, engaged in continuous negotiations on a sheer, endless 
stream  of  initiatives  and  proposals.  Determining  the  locus  and  logic  of  decision-making 
within the walls of the Justus Lipsius continues to be a major challenge. In fact, even long-
time participants  have difficulty  explaining why some issues  move swiftly and smoothly 
through the Council decision-making machinery while others ‘get stuck’ at working party, 
Coreper, or Council level
1. For outsiders, the challenge is even greater. A lot of effort so far 
has been put into determining the degree to which decisions were taken at the ministerial, the 
                                                 
1 These and subsequent ‘insider views’ are based on the participant observations of the author while working in 
the Council Working Party on the Western Balkans (Coweb) in 2010, internal reports of all Balkan related 
meetings at the different Council levels in the period 2003-2010, and in-depth interviews with 75 key players 
within  the  Council  and  the  Commission  who  concerned  themselves  with  the  EU’s  Balkan  policies.  More 
information on the methods for data collection can be found at: www.ru.nl/fm/smeets. EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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committee, or civil servant level. For years scholars have been mimicking each other when 
stating that 70% of work is done by the working parties, 15% is done by the Ambassadors, 
while another 15% is left for the Ministers themselves to decide on (cf. Hayes-Renshaw and 
Wallace 2006; Juncos and Pomorska 2011; Van Schendelen 1996. More recent studies speak 
of  a  35%-22%-43%  division  (Häge  2008).  Their  approach  was  primarily  procedural: 
determining  the  (highest)  level  at  which  an  issue  was  (last)  put  on  the  agenda.  While 
insightful, this does not explain the interplay between the different levels. It does not tell us 
about how, when, and why issues move up and down the organizational chain.  
Conventional bargaining theory is relatively silent when it comes to explaining the when and 
how of Council decision-making. The focus tends to be on accounting for (positive) outcomes 
rather than the policy processes that precede them (cf. Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 
2004). Most models consciously neglect the varying ability of individual negotiators to strike 
a deal under the assumption that such differences will cancel out on average (Bailer and 
Schneider 2006: 155). It does not really matter then what exactly is said and done in the 
‘smoky  backrooms’  of  the  Justus  Lipsius.  Decisions  result  from  member  states  taking 
positions, member states deciding on the employment of their resources, and consequently 
member states that ‘win’ or ‘lose’ negotiations. Although they acknowledge the importance 
of  agency,  mainly  in  the  relative  attribution  of  salience,  the  focus  is  definitely  on  the 
structural level.  
This is a valid approach if one primarily seeks to account for the content of the deal(s). It is 
less useful if one wants to explain how decisions actually came about, more specifically when 
and  why  suggestions  for  decisions  actually  reached  the  ministers.  This  paper’s  main 
contribution  lies  in  uncovering  these  internal  procedural  battles.  It  seeks  to  explain  how 
national representatives try to influence the course and pace of the decision-making process. 
It suggests reconceptualising day to day negotiations as incessant battles between drivers and 
brakemen (Schimmelfennig 2003), whereby the goal is to keep issues (from) moving through 
the Council’s decision-making machinery. The central question is twofold: what constitutes 
success in these internal interactions? And, how does one secure such success?  
The approach is as follows. I will first present the Council’s decision-making machinery, 
whereby the goal is to find the locus of decision-making inside the Justus Lipsius. I will then 
elaborate on the logic (of action) and whether this logic might be biased, so that it favours 
one side over the other. The larger part consists of process tracing analysis of one particular 
decision-making process. These are the negotiations about opening accession negotiations 
with Croatia. Process tracing is a method that is particularly suited to establishing (causal) 
mechanisms (cf. Beach and Pedersen 2012). The underlying idea is to find a more general 
mechanism by studying the particularities of one specific case. The crux lies in the ability to 
distinguish between the idiosyncratic (case-specific) and the more systematic elements in the 
explanation of events. It is to these systematic elements that I will return in the conclusion. 
   EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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1.   Finding the locus  
What  should  we  understand  to  be  success  in  Council  decision-making?  To  be  able  to 
determine  effectiveness  and  account  for  success,  we  need  to  know  who  is  actually 
negotiating. Figure 1 shows the institutional framework in which Council negotiations take 
place. Ministers (commonly referred to as ‘the Council’) are the only ones with ‘de jure’ 
decision-making authority. Even the European Council does not take decisions. Rather, the 
decisions are adopted by the General Affairs Council. The other levels presumably work as a 
clearing house. 
For substantive as well as methodological reasons, scholars tend to focus on specific levels. 
The methodological reasons are straightforward. For Council proceedings taking place below 
the  ministerial  level,  the  documentation  is  extremely  sparse  and  often  not  accessible  to 
outsiders.  In  fact,  even  our  understanding  of  what  goes  on  at  Council  level  is  limited. 
Scholars have had to limit themselves to studying the scarce documentation that is available 
(agendas, press reports, formal outcomes), or rely on ‘anecdotal evidence’ (cf. Bostock 2002; 
De  Zwaan  1995;  Hayes-Renshaw  and  Wallace  2006;  Heisenberg  2008;  Schneider  2008; 
Westlake and Galloway 2004). Thus, the most important reason why scholars choose to limit 
their attention to the top levels is that we know little about what goes on at the bottom two. 
Figure 1: Four levels of play in Council negotiations  
 
(Source: Author’s own diagram) 
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The substantive reasons are more difficult to pin down. They are related to the particular 
aspects of social reality on which scholars are theoretically inclined to focus their attention 
(cf. Warntjen 2010). To make matters more concrete, from an intergovernmental bargaining 
perspective it makes sense to focus on the proceedings at Council and European Council level 
(cf. Achen 2006; Bailer and Schneider 2006). This is, after all, where the actual bargaining 
takes place. Lower level negotiators are obviously limited in their bargaining possibilities. 
They  cannot  credibly  promise  rewards  or  threaten  with  punishments,  nor  can  they 
significantly alter their counterparts’ pay-off structure by means of side payments or package 
deals. All these means are usually the prerogative of the political level(s), which means that 
at the lower levels the bargaining space is usually quite small. In this line of reasoning, they 
mostly serve as throughput or ‘stand-in negotiators for their ministers’ (Häge 2007: 307).  
However, limiting our attention to the higher level(s) is problematic. This is because of the 
matter of orchestration. Ministers meet once a month to rush through their overloaded agenda 
(cf.  Gomez  and  Peterson  2001).  In  fact,  the  proceedings  at  the  ministerial  level  hardly 
deserve  the  designation  ‘debate’.  If  anything,  they  look  like  ritual  dances.  Much  of  the 
statements are declaratory, much of the debate is ‘pre-cooked’. There is little room for replies 
or  rebuttals.  Often,  there  is  no  need  for  them.  The  ministerial  intervention  in  itself  will 
generally  suffice  to  get  that  member  state’s  concerns  noted  and  taken  into  account.  All 
potential pitfalls and controversies have been addressed at the lower levels by then. So once 
an issue finally makes it onto the table of the ministers, insiders can usually anticipate the 
results. That there is little ‘spontaneous interaction’ at the ministerial level is understandable. 
Ministers are public actors, who will generally only want to concern themselves with an issue 
if there is a clear chance for arriving at a decision. One insider put it more succinctly:  
‘Nobody has an interest to end up in a divisive debate at Council or even European 
Council level. Ministers have little time and a Presidency will surely not want to 
waste  any  of  it  on  unpredictable  debates  with  uncertain  outcomes’  (Author’s 
interview, Brussels 2010). 
The Council is typically the final link in the chain. Member states are very much aware of the 
fact that once an issue makes it onto the ministerial agenda, they are usually already too late. 
Even a minister will have little chance to significantly change a decision-making process in 
motion, let alone turn it around as he or she wishes (cf. Heynen 2011: 12). It would appear 
that once issues (finally) reach the ministers, most battles have already been fought.  
There seems to be ample reason to look for the more substantive part of the negotiations at 
the  lower  levels.  These  are  the  civil  servants  and  ambassadors  who  meet  on  a  weekly 
(sometimes even daily) basis, and who therefore have the time and the technical expertise to 
engage in substantive deliberations (cf. Aus 2008; Niemann 2006; Risse and Kleine 2010). 
Those who study the working party level tend to argue that these civil servants play the most 
important part while ambassadors only deal with general matters (cf. Beyers and Dierickx 
1998; Fouilleux et al. 2005; Juncos and Pomorska 2011). Those focussing on the Committee 
(Coreper) level typically explain why this is in fact the most crucial node (‘the place to do the 
deals’) in the Council (cf. Lewis 2005; De Zwaan 1995). But both groups primarily attribute 
agency and influence to the negotiators at the lower levels. EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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However, focussing solely on the lower levels is equally problematic. This is because of the 
concept of anticipation. In their day to day negotiations, the lower levels are not acting as 
‘free agents’ but are anticipating what their respective ministers would be willing to accept 
(Westlake  and  Galloway  2004:  262–64).  The  leeway  they  have  in  carrying  out  their 
instructions  is  usually  limited.  Working  party  and  Committee  members  are  essentially 
negotiating from fixed positions (Pollack and Shaffer 2008: 149). After all, it is not as if they 
themselves are taking a position on certain matters instead of their capital(s). Lower level 
negotiators are thus primarily exchanging positions and notifying each other about the salient 
points of the dossiers on which their respective ministers would like to personally state their 
opinion.  Negotiations  are  to  a  large  degree  about  deciding  whether,  when,  and  how  the 
political level will concern itself with a certain matter (Bostock 2002: 231–32). Lower level 
proceedings serve to get an overview of who is seriously committed to playing this round and 
wherein his or her interests or concerns lie. But even Coreper ambassadors are very much 
aware of the fact that the buck does not stop with them. So the decision-making power these 
lower levels have is primarily procedural.  
This short overview of the decision-making levels in the Council clearly shows why scholars 
have had difficulty determining ‘who decides’ in the Council (Häge 2008). Trying to find the 
locus of decision-making gives the impression of looking for the proverbial ‘ghost in the 
machine’ (cf. Lieshout 1995). Due to the twin processes of orchestration and anticipation it is 
hard to determine the primary level of play. In their day to day negotiations, the lower levels 
are clearly anticipating what their respective ministers would be willing to accept. But they 
are simultaneously setting the terms of a potential ministerial debate. It seems that there is no 
(unitary) actor taking decisions in the Council. Decisions do not stem from the proceedings at 
one particular level, but are rather the (to a certain degree unintended) result of the strategic 
interplay between the different levels. 
What is the mechanism behind this strategic movement of issues back and forth across the 
Council hierarchy? Schneider and Cederman (1994) suggested explaining the stop and go 
pattern of European integration as the result of battles between those who want to slow down 
and those who want to speed up the integration process. The same logic, I believe, underlies 
the more routine interactions in the Council. Day to day negotiations are incessant attempts to 
enhance  (drivers)  or  reduce  (brakemen)  the  momentum  behind  specific  decision-making 
processes. They are ultimately about keeping issues on or off the (Ministers’) table.  The 
negotiation phase is in essence always a battle between those who want to change and those 
who  want  to  preserve  the  status  quo,  meaning  the  existing  line  of  policy.  Those  who 
challenge the status quo will do so by opening up a debate in which they will present a claim 
about their preferred change. Such claims will typically enter the arena at the working party 
level. Generally speaking, the drivers’ goal is to swiftly steer them through these lower level 
negotiations, through Coreper, and up to the Ministers, so that an actual decision can be 
taken.  The  brakemen  will  want  to  keep  matters  off  the  ministerial  agenda,  either  by 
preventing them from moving to the higher levels or by keeping referring them back to the 
lower levels. EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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The main ‘argumentative resource’ Council negotiators can use in their interactions is that of 
potential higher level support. Both drivers and brakemen can claim that they will be backed 
up on the matter by their ambassadors and (prime) ministers respectively. In this way, drivers 
can try to induce the Presidency to put issues on the Coreper or Council Agenda, whereas 
brakemen will want to prevent this from happening. There is an element of bluff in the game. 
Negotiators can claim that they are backed up, even though he or she is unsure whether that 
level is really willing to invest in the matter.
2 After all, the main thing that negotiators are 
unsure about is the salience  that others (currently) attach to a particular issue (cf. Naurin 
2009: 44). It is salience that determines how far – or to put it more precisely ‘how high up’ – 
member states are willing to take an issue. Whether an individual negotiator is successful 
ultimately depends on the willingness of others (and the Presidency in particular) to call their 
potential bluff.  
2.  Determining the logic of action  
In the previous section I elaborated on the battles between drivers and brakemen that underlie 
the interplay between different Council levels. This provides us with an answer to the first 
question: what constitutes success in internal negotiations? As I explained above, in lower 
level debates there is usually little to bargain for and no-one to deliberate with. Success rather 
lies in the ability to procure or preclude procedural progress. This brings us to the second 
question: how to be successful? Are these procedural battles fought on equal ground? Or do 
either the drivers or the brakemen find themselves in a better position? As will become clear 
below, there appear to be valid reasons to back up either one of these claims.  
Departing from an intergovernmental bargaining logic, one would be inclined to favour the 
brakemen. In battles about whether to move forward or to stay put, brakemen obviously hold 
the power of the status quo. Common bargaining logic holds that those that are set to gain 
most from a certain decision will have to make the most concessions (Moravcsik 1998: 54). 
Put differently, those who are most satisfied with the status quo will be able to dictate the 
terms of any new agreement, which explains why the pace of decision-making is generally 
determined by those who are least receptive to change (cf. Thomas 2009: 349). Because EU 
member  states  have  little  means  to  force  each  other  into  accepting  an  agreement,  such 
agreements will rarely surpass the lowest common denominator. In decision-making under 
the unanimity rule, the lowest common denominator is often found in maintaining the status 
quo (ante).
3  
In this particular type of game, leverage stems from the ability to strategically deploy one’s 
domestic  constraints  (Schneider  and  Cederman  1994).  The  underlying  logic  is  Thomas 
                                                 
2 ‘Investing’  means that he or she is  willing to  make a  plenary intervention on the  matter. A higher level 
intervention equals a higher investment by that member state.  
3 Assuming that possibilities for otherwise achieving the set objectives, for example by unilateral action or by 
constructing alternative coalitions, are limited (Moravcsik 1998: 63–5). EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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Schelling’s paradox of weakness, in which the power of the negotiator rests on a ‘manifest 
inability to make concessions and meet demands’ (1980: 19). If on the national level, an actor 
can openly commit himself to a specific position, thereby creating domestic audience costs, 
he acquires an advantage at the European level. Putnam (1988) referred to it as the logic of 
two-level games. Politicians are always simultaneously operating on the international level 
(level I) and the domestic level (level II). Those with a small domestic win-set – meaning 
those who face severe limits on what they can get accepted back home – have a bargaining 
advantage  at  level  I.  They  can  credibly  threaten  the  others  with  negotiation  failure. 
Conversely, those who  have a large domestic win-set can be ‘pushed around’ on level  I 
(Putnam 1988: 440). They will be the ones making concessions, simply because they are 
considered to be able to make them.  
The implications for the internal negotiations are that the Council is severely limited in its 
possibilities to act decisively, because it continuously needs to cater to the needs of those who 
do not feel a particular need to act (cf. Westlake and Galloway 2004). This logic obviously 
works to the advantage of the least willing (i.e. the brakemen). 
In spite of this bargaining logic, there are persistent claims that routine Council decision-
making  favours  those  who  want  to  move  forward  (cf.  Niemann  2006;  Stone  Sweet  and 
Sandholtz 1997). This also seems to be the dominant impression amongst insiders. It has to 
do  with  day  to  day  realities  inside  the  Justus  Lipsius  that  appear  to  create  their  own 
momentum and in which the default option is to proceed. International relations theorists are 
inclined to see something of a neo-functionalist logic at work, in which decision-making 
processes develop their own dynamics, while the participants stumble from one negotiation 
round right into the next (Haas 1958, Niemann 2006). It is a process driven by the agenda-
setting powers and brokerage role of the Commission and the rotating Council Presidency. As 
one insider put it:  
‘Commission and Presidency are committed to keep the process going. Those accused 
of being in a blocking position constantly find themselves in the dock, having to 
explain  to  the  others  what  is  so  terribly  important  for  them’  (Author’s  interview, 
Brussels 2010). 
According to this view, Council negotiators are not really playing a two level game (Niemann 
and Schmitter 2009: 48). It is rather an elite-driven process of technocratic decision-making 
and incremental change. This particularly applies to the lower level negotiations which have 
presumably evolved into ‘a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants 
refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means 
of  compromises  upgrading  common  interests’  (Haas  1958:  66).  Scholars  opting  for  this 
perspective focus less on formal bargaining constraints  and more on the informal norms 
guiding lower level interactions; the most important of which is ‘the shared responsibility to 
come up with solutions and keep the process going’ (Lewis 2005: 949–50). Being part of an 
organization creates a sense of ownership and responsibility (cf. Kerremans 1996: 232). Such 
feelings will probably not be strong enough to override pressing national concern, but at the 
very least they can ‘empower’ the willing (i.e. the drivers). This of course does not mean that 
the drivers can constantly and carelessly ask for matters to be brought before the ministers. EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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To remain effective, they (also) have to safeguard the image of responsible decision-making. 
But one would expect them to be able to employ a strategy of shaming, referring to the public 
exposure of illegitimate goals or inappropriate (delaying) tactics (cf. Schimmelfennig 2003: 
199). This would imply a process in which the brake is at best a temporary option. Decisions 
might at times appear long overdue. But the neo-functionalist logic ensures that progress will 
eventually be made.  
3.  The Battle for Gotovina  
This article has (re)defined negotiation success as the ability to control the movement of 
issues through the different Council levels. With regard to being successful there are well-
founded reasons to expect those who want to take issues upward (drivers) as well as those 
that want to keep them at the lower levels (brakemen) to be in a better position. An answer to 
the  second  question  can  thus  only  be  found  by  means  of  an  in-depth  analysis  of  actual 
negotiating dynamics.  
The issue area under focus is that of foreign policy-making and enlargement (of the Western 
Balkans). The reason for selecting it is that this is an issue area in which the Council can act 
rather autonomously, meaning without formal involvement of the European Parliament and 
without  much  interference  from  lobbyists  and  pressure  groups
4. Although the European 
Commission(er) formally only has an advisory role, it is nevertheless prominently present. 
However, I still maintain that the issue-area offers perhaps the best opportunity for studying 
Council proceedings in and by themselves. We are dealing with decision -making under the 
unanimity rule
5, which means that one side cannot outvote or outnumber the other. Drivers 
and brakemen are basically forced to continue their negotiations until a decision is reached or 
the matter is dropped (non-decision or inaction). Admittedly, we could be dealing with an 
‘extreme’  rather  than  ‘typical’  case  of  Council  decision-making,  which  might  limit  the 
possibilities for generalizations.
6 However, when the goal is hypothesis generation and theory 
development instead of theory testing, such cases tend to be more insightful (Gerring 2007: 
89). 
The outcome this paper is trying to explain is the October 2005 decision to open accession 
negotiation with Croatia. The decision stemmed from negotiations that had spanned three 
years and six Presidencies. The debate was largely (but not solely) about Croatia’s need to 
‘fully cooperate’ with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
The bone of contention was Croatia’s unwillingness/inability to capture Ante Gotovina, a 
Croatian General and commanding officer during ‘Operation Storm’ which, in August 1995, 
                                                 
4 Although the European Parliament has the power of consent in the final decision to allow a new member state. 
5 Although under the rules of unanimity, an abstention does  not count as a no-vote,  which  means that the 
Council can also ‘move’ with some member states abstaining.  
6 Moreover, if one wants to consider this an extreme case, it was one that was dealt with thro ugh the routine or 
‘day to day’ decision making channels, as they were presented above. EIoP     © 2013 by Sandrino Smeets 
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led to the ‘recapturing’ of Serb held territories in Croatia. Gotovina was indicted by the ICTY 
in July 2001. The main drivers were the enlargement friendly member states (Italy, Greece) 
as  well  as  the  ‘friends  of  Croatia’  (Austria,  Germany).  The  primary  brakemen  were  the 
enlargement-weary member states  (France, the Netherlands) as  well as the ICTY-minded 
member states (the UK, Sweden, and again the Netherlands). The battle would consist of six 
rounds, which will be analyzed below. 
3.1.  Round I: Asking the Commission for an avis 
On  21  February  2003,  Croatia  was  the  first  Western  Balkan  country  to  apply  for  EU 
membership. The first procedural battle that needed to be fought inside the Justus Lipsius was 
about  asking  the  Commission  for  an  avis.  It  was  initiated  by  the  brakemen,  who  had 
continuing doubts about Croatia’s commitment to ICTY cooperation. As it turned out, Article 
49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) did not give a definitive answer as to whether 
such an application was to be transferred automatically to the Commission. It was unclear 
whether  it  required  a  political  decision  by  the  Council.  In  the  relevant  working  party, 
brakemen started to argue that such a political decision was in fact needed. However, these 
lower level discussions made it clear that most of the other member states considered this to 
be a technical step.  
The brakemen therefore offered to settle on this matter. Already in April 2003 the Council 
asked the Commission for an avis. However, this decision came with (verbal) side-payments 
to the brakemen. The April 2003 Conclusions were not positively framed; they merely stated 
that the Council decided ‘to implement the procedure laid down in Article 49’.
7 Apparently, 
the aforementioned ambiguity in the Article was gone. What the brakemen obtained with this 
‘neutral’  formulation  was  the  guarantee  that  a  political  debate  would  in  due  time  be 
necessary.  The  Conclusions  confirmed  that  asking  the  Commission’s  avis  in  no  way 
precluded a decision by the Council on the feasibility of Croatia’s application. Seeing that the 
Commission reserved a year for the preparation of the avis, this debate would probably take 
place when brakemen (i.e. the Netherlands) instead of drivers (Greece, Italy) were presiding 
over the proceedings. 
3.2.  Round II: Setting the terms of the debate 
As the Commission was working on its avis, the brakemen would have preferred not to talk 
about Croatia for a while. Like the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, they were 
primarily on a quest for Gotovina, and on that front there had been little progress. To the 
                                                 
7 2501
st  General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  Council  meeting,  Luxembourg  14-4-2003.Croatia.  Agence 
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drivers, and the Italian Presidency in particular, it was clear that this matter would not simply 
blow over. Instead of continuing to monitor the matter at working party level, they decided to 
face the problem head-on and invite Del Ponte to the October 2003 Council meeting.  
This first attempt to take matters to the ministers would be only mildly successful (for the 
drivers). Perhaps the Presidency had acted too rashly, or perhaps they overestimated their 
ability to steer the ministerial debate. Most probably, they underestimated the influence of the 
General Prosecutor. From the start, Del Ponte and her team adopted a clear-cut strategy. 
Basically, they wanted the EU to adopt a policy line in which each and every step towards 
EU-membership was conditional upon full cooperation with the ICTY, as defined by the 
Prosecutor of the ICTY. This last part was key. It was also Del Ponte’s message to the 
Council:  
‘The assessment: that is my job. You provide the political pressure. I will be the one 
to judge the efforts made by the Balkan states’ (Author’s interview, Carla Del Ponte, 
Ascona 2011).  
In a way, this approach guillotined the debate. Most ministers predictably paid lip service to 
the importance of the ICTY. The Dutch and British foreign ministers made it abundantly 
clear that they would take this into account when judging Croatia’s application. Some of the 
drivers wondered whether it would not be better to ‘let justice take its course’ or apply this 
particular conditionality ‘later on in the process’. But what the brakemen were unable to get 
the  drivers  to  acknowledge  was  the  political  unwillingness  in  Zagreb.  The  Council 
Conclusions did not directly address this matter. They merely ‘noted with deep concern that a 
number of countries and parties in the region were still failing to cooperate fully with the 
Tribunal’
8.  
What the drivers ‘won’ with this rather ambiguous wording was the possibility to reopen the 
debate in the near future. For the brakemen the battle was about capturing Gotovina. But they 
were reluctant to frame it in such a way, as it would provide Croatia with an easy way out. It 
could simply maintain that the General was dead or not in Croatia. Their strategy was thus to 
keep  out  of  a  debate  about  the  meaning  of  full  cooperation.  Instead,  they  unequivocally 
aligned themselves with the judgment of the General Prosecutor. The ICTY itself had every 
interest in not defining full cooperation, because this would mean the eventual judgment 
could also be made by others. Thus from the outset, a lot of emphasis was put on who should 
be allowed to judge Croatia. Lower level negotiations were primarily about the weight that 
should be given to Del Ponte’s judgment, and how her assessment would be procedurally 
embedded in the Council. Drivers might have had their doubts about always having to go via 
Del Ponte, but they were as of yet unable to by-pass her assessments. 
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3.3.  Round III: Noting the Commission avis 
At the beginning of 2004, things were beginning to look better for the drivers. Due to their 
behind the scenes efforts, the Council had asked for the Commission avis to come out in the 
spring, so that a decision could be taken at the European Council in June at the latest.
9 For the 
Irish  Presidency,  deciding  on  Croatia’s  membership  application  was  the  only  potential 
deliverable  in  the  issue  area.  With  this  purpose  in  mind,  Croatia’s  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs, Zuzul, visited Coreper on 25 February, trying to  convince the Ambassadors that 
Gotovina was nowhere to be found. On 17 February, SG/HR Solana met with the Croatian 
Prime Minister Sanader, subtly mentioning the fact that Del Ponte was not a member of the 
EU and that it would be up to the Council to decide on the application
10. In the meantime, 
Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen was lobbying Del Ponte for a (positive) assessment, 
so  that  the  avis  could  come  out.  This  assessment  came  in  the  form  of  a  telephone 
conversation and a letter in which Del Ponte reassured Verheugen that Croatia was fully 
cooperating  at  the  moment.  It  was  Del  Ponte’s  remarkable  turn  that  enabled  the 
Commissioner to present his avis on 20 April
11. 
The obvious question Coreper had to concern itself with was how to react to it. Drivers, 
Austria in particular, were pushing for a welcoming reaction. Brakemen in fact hoped to 
avoid all sorts of reactions. The April Council further discussed the matter. Most member 
states welcomed the avis, but the brakemen managed to avoid Council Conclusions on the 
matter. They were, however, unable to prevent it from being taken to the Europea n Council. 
In the run up to the June 2004 Summit, Coreper necessarily engaged in a debate about 
procedural pathways: whether the European Council should set a specific date for the 
opening of the accession negotiations. Brakemen generally consider dates to  be dangerous 
because they imply automatism, which is certainly why drivers like them. Coreper managed 
to find the compromise in agreeing on a time frame instead of a specific date.
12 The European 
Council would award Croatia candidate status and the Conclusions would read: negotiations 
could commence ‘early in 2005’
13.  
3.4.   Round IV: Getting the (conditional) date  
When the Netherlands took over the Presidency, they were already anticipating the European 
Council of December 2004, which would simultaneously have to decide on the opening of 
accession negotiations with both Croatia and Turkey. The main players were the same: the 
UK pushing for Turkey and on the brake on Croatia, Austria pushing for Croatia while on the 
brake on Turkey. Fears about a political trade-off were certainly justified. As the German 
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Chancellor Schröder’s amicable relations with Sanader were the mirror image of his attitude 
towards Del Ponte, one could more or less count on Croatia ‘getting the date’. What the 
Dutch were aiming for was a conditional one. To achieve this, they wanted the Council to 
adopt firm Conclusions on Croatia’s lacking ICTY cooperation. 
The Netherlands stuck to their strategy of protracting the lower level debates. Members of 
Del Ponte’s team were constantly invited to share their views with relevant working parties. 
These  debates  were  quickly  turning  into  ritual  dances  about  Croatia’s  inability  or 
unwillingness to apprehend the General. The main event would be the October 2004 meeting, 
at which Del Ponte was invited to share her ‘deep concerns’, after which the Council was to 
adopt  unambiguous  Conclusions  on  the  matter.  The  strategy  apparently  worked.  The 
Conclusions explicitly state that: ‘continued failure to cooperate fully and in a timely manner 
with the ICTY would seriously jeopardize further movement towards the EU
14. The matter 
was then transferred to Coreper and the Council. But here drivers and brakemen were more 
evenly matched. The debate was on whether the Conclusions should explicitly mention that it 
was the Council or rather Del Ponte that had to confirm full cooperation. Ambassadors and 
ministers  struggled  to  find  the  right  dictum,  but  eventually  settled  for  a  minimalistic 
approach. The European Council would suggest the opening of accession negotiations on 17  
March 2005: ‘provided that there is full cooperation with the ICTY’
15. 
3.5.  Round V: ‘Suspend and complement’ 
The European Council Conclusions clearly stated that the Council had to consult with Del 
Ponte before 17 March  2005, in  order to  be able to  decide on the opening of accession 
negotiations. The question was when and how. Brakemen would have liked again to invite 
Del Ponte to the Council, or else get a complete Report from her about the current level of 
cooperation. But what the Luxembourg Presidency foresaw was a last minute meeting of 
Foreign Minister Asselborn and Prime Minister Juncker with Del Ponte, after which they 
would present a proposal to be discussed in the Council. Until that date, they would have 
liked to avoid Council level debates on the ICTY.  
The new Enlargement Commissioner Rehn made this approach impossible. He opened the 
attack  at  the  Council  meeting  in  January  2005.  According  to  Rehn,  Croatia  felt  too 
comfortable  and  convinced  that  it  would  achieve  the  opening  of  accession  negotiations 
without any further efforts. The brakemen obviously agreed with the Commissioner. For the 
drivers, this was a battle which they had not anticipated. The ministers were caught off guard, 
as the Presidency tried to no avail to smother the debate. As a result, the January Conclusions 
went ever further than those of October: ‘Full and unconditional cooperation with the ICTY 
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remains an essential requirement for further movement towards the EU’
16. Only three days 
after the Council, Del Ponte was invited for a lunch with the Coreper Ambassadors.
17 She 
decided to pour some more oil on the fire, recounting how Sanader flaunted his German and 
Austrian friends who would safeguard the accession negotiations for him.  
The Conclusions of March 2005 were the anticipated resu lt. They provide us with one of 
those rare moments when the Council did not  cloak its difference of opinion. They stated 
that:  ‘after deliberation by the Council, and in the absence of a common agreement, the 
opening of accession negotiations has been postponed’
18. These ‘deliberations’ had again 
been mainly procedural: whether the suspension was a technical decision that could be taken 
by Coreper or a political one that should be dealt with by the Council. Coreper would also 
have to decide on the follow up
19. While the suspension itself was certainly a clear victory for 
the brakemen, the drivers managed to get the side payments this time. First, they got the 
negotiation protocol approved so the Commission could begin negotiations as soon as the 
Council would give the green light. Second, the Council felt it necessary to stress that it was 
the  ultimate  assessor.  The  Conclusions  stated  that  negotiations  will  start  ‘as  soon  as  the 
Council has established that Croatia is fully cooperating with the ICTY’
20. What lay beneath 
this truism was an attempt to undermine Del Ponte’s assessment capabilities. Third, since 
brakemen refused to openly admit that it was about ‘achieving a given result’ (Gotovina), the 
drivers could reframe it into ‘an obligation in substance’
21. In other words, all Croatia would 
now have to do was prove to the Council that it showed the necessary efforts. The battle 
changed. It was now primarily about how the Council should judge these efforts. For this, the 
drivers  had  suggested  something  of  a  collective  monitoring  mechanism  that  could 
‘objectively assess’ the current level of cooperation. 
The  brakemen  had  (again)  been  set  on  avoiding  a  debate  at  European  Council  level, 
something  which  they  (again)  failed  to  prevent.  The  drivers  reopened  the  debate  at  the 
European Council of 23 March, but this did not lead to changes in the Conclusions. What it 
did lead to was the announcement of a taskforce which was to monitor Croatia’s efforts to 
apprehend Gotovina
22. Drivers scored an important victory with this. While brakemen tend to 
see  it  as  a  face -saver  or  at  best  ‘consultative  body’,  drivers  expected  it  to  fulfil  a 
complementary  role  in  assessing  Croatia.  Coreper  subsequently  concerned  itself  with  the 
‘political assessment faculty’ of this taskforce. While its formal competencies would indeed 
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be limited, what the drivers managed to achieve was to banish Del Ponte from the Plenaries. 
It was decided that, from now on, she would present her views and opinions to the taskforce, 
instead of directly to the Council. From this point onwards, the battle was merely about when 
she would be invited to do so.  
3.6.  Round VI: ‘Delivering Del Ponte’ 
A lot of conjectures surround the UK Presidency of 2005, the most persistent of which is the 
trade-off that presumably took place at the Council meeting of 3 October, at which the UK 
managed  to  get  Austria  to  agree  to  accession  negotiations  with  Turkey  in  return  for  the 
opening of negotiations with Croatia. However, according to this study, the more relevant 
question is how the matter actually reached the ministers. This shows that the UK was really 
not that sure about their ability to steer Del Ponte and thus procure the trade-off. This is why 
the UK had tried to decouple the two files. They got the Council to ask for a report of the 
taskforce already in July 2005. Del Ponte had tried to preclude such hasty assessments by 
suggesting, at the beginning of June, to give Croatia another three or four months to produce 
tangible results.
23 This made it hard for the July Council to conclude anyt hing else than a 
promise to come back to the issue in October.
24 
After this decoupling attempt had failed, the UK Presidency wanted to make sure that Del 
Ponte’s assessment would be as close as possible to the actual Council meeting. In this, they 
succeeded. Del Ponte was invited to address the taskforce that very same day. There were 
three possible scenarios: either Del Ponte was completely satisfied, still very unsatisfied, or 
something  in  between.  Many  expected  the  last.  Drivers  as  well  as  brakemen  were  thus 
surprised by her assessment that ‘Croatia had been cooperating fully for a couple of weeks 
now’
25.  But  the  fact  that  she  spoke  those  magic  words  precluded  further  debate  in  the 
Council. Brakeman had become entrapped in their strategy of hiding behind the judgment of 
Del  Ponte. Therefore, they  could  not  even make use of their most important  substantive 
argument, which was that Gotovina had not been located or apprehended. They could only 
ask for this ‘full cooperation to be maintained, until the last remaining indictee was in The 
Hague’
26. 
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Conclusion 
This  paper  departed  from  two  research  questions:  What  constitutes  success  in  internal 
Council  negotiations  and  how  does  one  bring  about  such  success?  Intergovernmental 
bargaining theory would look for success in the substance of the matter. Effectiveness is 
attributed to member states that are able to realize favourable bargains, primarily by means of 
trade-offs or package deals.  
Yet it would be hard to explain the October 2005 decision on Croatia in such a way. After all, 
the drivers wanted the opening of accession negotiations; the brakemen wanted Croatia to 
deliver Gotovina. What did come out was what neither side had wanted: a heavily delayed 
accession  process  in  return  for  an  uncertain  promise  (that  Gotovina  would  indeed  be 
apprehended).  Moreover,  if  this  was  supposed  to  be  a  package  deal,  it  was  a  highly 
unfavourable one for Austria.
27 Nor was the opening of accession negotiations the very least 
(the lowest common denominator) the Council could do. That wo uld have been simply to 
wait for Gotovina.  
This article suggests looking for success on the procedural level. Internal negotiations are 
essentially about agreeing on the appropriate way to proceed with the decision-making on an 
issue. More specifically, they are about moving issues back and forth between the Council’s 
decision-making levels. 
There is the persistent impression that in this kind of routine decision-making, the advantage 
lies with those who want to move forward. There is neo-functionalist reasoning behind this; 
the kind of reasoning we also see in this specific case. Drivers like to present the opening of 
accession negotiations as something that was bound to happen: 
‘Gotovina and the suspension of the opening of accession negotiations was just a 
delaying factor. Everyone knew we were going to move ahead in due time.’ (Author’s 
interview, Stefan Lehne, Vienna 2010). 
The detailed reconstruction of the actual negotiation dynamics, I believe, convincingly shows 
that such reasoning is flawed. If one only looks at the amount of time and investment it took, 
it is clear that there was little self-evidence in the process. Nor was there a guarantee that the 
Council was indeed going to move ahead ‘in due time’.
28 In fact, if Del Ponte’s judgment had 
been even slightly different, it would most probably have led to protracted delays.  
Thus, rather than being intergovernmental or neo-functionalist in nature, the game displays a 
different kind of logic; a logic wherein one side was trying to induce while the other side was 
trying  to  preclude  the  next  step  towards  an  eventual  decision  (about  opening  accession 
negotiations).  A  pro-active  Commissioner  could  help  to  maintain,  but  also  diffuse,  the 
momentum, as did Verheugen in April 2004 in favour of the drivers or Rehn in January 2005 
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to the benefit of the brakemen. A pseudo-neutral Presidency could do the same, be it the 
Dutch in their quest for tough ICTY Conclusions or the British in their sudden willingness to 
be pragmatic about the actual arrest of Gotovina. However, the main battles were fought 
between the drivers and brakemen themselves. Whereby the drivers were constantly trying to 
take matters to the Council and European Council, the brakemen were trying to keep the 
discussions at the lower levels. To be sure, brakemen would have preferred to wait quietly for 
Gotovina, instead of engaging in these repetitive debates about ‘full cooperation’.
29 But it 
seems  that  there  was  simply  no  way  to  avoid  these  debates.  It  was  the  most  promising 
reaction to the drivers’ successful attempts to keep the matter on the table. 
This  brings  us  to  the  second  question  of  how  to  be  successful.  Here  I  will  travel  from 
idiosyncratic to systematic characteristics. There is a reason why Council negotiations are 
commonly referred to as battles of attrition. Negotiators need to pick their battles, but then be 
willing to stand their ground in the battles they decide to pick (Bostock 2002). Scholars 
generally try to account for Council decisions either as the result of high level bargains or 
lower  level  deliberations  (cf.  Arregui  and  Thomson  2009;  Niemann  2006).  However,  in 
internal Council negotiations, there is usually little to trade and no one to convince. This is 
why I approached the negotiations from a different angle. Here, decisions result not from the 
proceedings at specific levels, but are the result of the interplay between these levels. The 
mechanism behind this interplay is in essence bureaucratic. It seeks to explain decisions by 
means  of  the  interactions  of  semi-autonomous  sub-units  fulfilling  their  organizationally 
defined roles (cf. Allison 1971; Lieshout 1995). This makes it difficult to assign agency to 
one particular level in the Council. The lower levels are anticipating a higher level debate, the 
contours of which they themselves are inadvertently marking out.  
In terms of the structure versus agency debate, which is the topic of this Special Issue, this 
paper urges us to pay more attention to the matter ‘embedded agency’ (Ripoll Servent and 
Busby, this issue). In our quest to determine the logic behind EU decision-making, this paper 
has departed from a set of simple and straightforward questions. What are the actual interests 
of individual working party delegates, ambassadors, or ministers? What can they realistically 
hope  to  achieve  by  means  of  their  interactions?  And  most  importantly,  what  are  the 
behavioural options open to them? Bureaucratic theorizing dictates that an institution can 
only  function  if  it  manages  to  ‘reward’  the  behaviour  of  some  while  ‘punishing’  the 
behaviour of others. This paper can be seen as an attempt to determine the (negotiating) 
behaviour that is generally rewarded (with success) inside the Council. Council negotiators 
might be limited in their ability to change their counterparts’ interests, positions, or pay off 
structures.  However,  what  they  can  try  to  do  is  keep  the  issue  on  or  off  the  ministerial 
agenda; this under the supposition that those who have to ‘raise their flag’ too often and on 
too high a level will at some point realize that they might have to settle on the matter. The 
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key to success then lies in the ability to keep the debate going, either at the higher (drivers) or 
at the lower (brakemen) levels.  
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